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1 Introduction
Venture capitalists invested $28.3 billion in 3,808 deals in 2008 2 , many of these
through syndications accounting for two-thirds of all VC investment rounds,
making it a significant phenomenon in this industry. Syndicated venture in-
vestment in privately held firms is hypothesized to lead to superior venture
selection (Wilson (1968), Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Lerner (1994), and Sorenson
and Stuart (2001)), to mitigate information asymmetries between the initial
venture investor and other later-round potential investors (Admati and Pflei-
derer (1994), and Lerner (1994)), to add value by monitoring the performance
of portfolio companies (Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) who test both
selection and value-add, finding in favor of the latter), and to amplify the
value-addition of venture capitalists (Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and
Stromberg (2004), Lindsey (2008), and Hochberg (2008)). While research ex-
amining the performance of venture capital-backed firms is abundant, we do
not have a complete understanding of the rationale behind VC syndication.
Although theories in finance suggest that selection and value-add by monitor-
ing should be different if capital is provided by a syndicate instead of a single
VC, there has been limited scrutiny of the multivalent impact of syndication
on venture firms’ exit performance.
The decision to syndicate by the lead VC and entrepreneur depends on the
trade-off between the likely benefits of syndication (coming from selecting bet-
ter ventures or adding value to the firm) versus relinquishing some value to
new syndicate members. 3 We conduct a large-scale study of the determinants
of syndication and its impact on exit performance, using 98,068 financing
rounds of venture firms in the Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics (Ven-
tureXpert) database from 1980 to 2003. Rather than only examine returns,
we focus on three different dimensions of exit performance (i.e., exit probabil-
ities, time-to-exit, and exit multiples) and thereby reframe the debate as to
whether a syndicate selects promising companies and/or adds value to port-
folio firms. Employing an analytical framework of effort-sharing under which
a syndicate’s effort is allocated to ex-ante venture selection and post-selection
value-addition activity, and controlling for endogenous treatment effects with
apposite econometrics, we are able to determine the relative importance of
2 See http://www.pwcmoneytree.com
3 In addition to selection and value-add, Lerner (1994) suggests that expected fu-
ture reciprocity is also a motive for syndication, and this is empirically confirmed
in Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007). See also evidence in Hochberg, Ljungqvist
and Lu (2009) suggesting that syndication may be used as a barrier to entry where
networks of VCs aim to control market share.
3the selection and value addition roles in VC syndications for each of the three
dimensions of venture performance.
Consider a VC syndicated project where any synergy arising from syndication
is attributable to selection and/or monitoring effort. Usually, the project is
sourced by a lone VC, who conducts the initial due diligence to ensure that
the project has potential. This VC then approaches the syndicate to consider
the project. An initial effort e ∈ (0, 1) is expended by the syndicate on project
selection. Assume there are two types of projects, high quality (H), and low
quality (L). The exit multiple obtained from each respectively will be denoted
{YH , YL}. Define the relative ratio of multiples to be η = YH/YL. The more
effort expended on selection increases the chances that the project chosen will
be of high quality. Assuming that the efficacy of project choice is linear in
effort, the expected multiple of the chosen project will be eYH + (1− e)YL.
Total effort is normalized to unity. Therefore, post-selection effort (1−e) is put
into subsequent monitoring by the syndicate to add value to the project. The
probability of exit per period then depends on monitoring effort. We define
this probability to be p = (1− e). 4
The expected multiple on the project is the probability of exit times the ex-
pected multiple conditional on exit:
E(Y ) = (1− e)[eYH + (1− e)YL]
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to e, we get the first-order
condition:
dE(Y )
de
= YH − 2eYH − 2(1− e)YL = 0
and solving for e results in optimal selection effort
e∗ =
YH − 2YL
2YH − 2YL =
η/2− 1
η − 1
4 In this simple model, we do not assume that good selection feeds into a higher
probability of exit, only into a greater multiple on exit. Other specifications of the
probability of exit are feasible, such a p = (1 − e)(1 + e), where the second term
reflects the benefits to selection on exit probability. Note that with this modification,
as effort e on selection increases, the probability of exit does decline, but in a slower
(concave) manner, versus a fast (linear) drop as in the simpler case. Qualitatively,
the results do not change.
4The following comparative statics follow immediately:
η ↑ ∞ =⇒ e∗ ↑ 1, η ↓ 2 =⇒ e∗ ↓ 0
When η = YH/YL increases, the model predicts that more effort of the syn-
dicate will be directed to project selection. That is, as high quality projects
become relatively superior to low quality ones (i.e. as η increases), the syndi-
cate naturally finds that it is worth expending more effort on project choice.
In other words, when firm quality dispersion is large, syndicates spend more
time making sure that the chosen venture is of high quality, translating into
higher multiples on exit. And, as the difference between high and low type
projects declines, more effort will be directed to value-addition through moni-
toring, translating into more likely and timely exit. Assessing performance via
multiple metrics enables us to assess the role of a syndicate in this framework.
Differential returns from investing in syndicated ventures versus non-syndicated
ones may arise directly from the synergies of syndication in monitoring (the
value-added hypothesis of Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002)), or may be
the result of selection (Lerner (1994), i.e. syndicates select more promising
projects. Endogeneity is posited in the model of Cumming (2001) and in the
model of Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007)). The literature is unclear about
the relative importance of selection and value-add. In our framework they may
be complementary in outcome, though competing for the total effort of the
syndicate. Both selection and value-addition may increase expected multiples
by enhancing the probability of exit, shortening the time-to-exit, and picking
firms with greater prospects.
Our departure from the existing literature lies in identifying the extent to
which selection and value-addition contribute separately to the components
(multiple, probability of exit, time-to-exit) of the differential expected perfor-
mance between syndicated and non-syndicated ventures. What if the benefits
of syndication lie purely in selection and not in value-addition? Then, after
correcting for endogenous selection effects (Greene (1993)), we should find no
difference between syndicated and non-syndicated ventures across all three
of our performance criteria. On the other hand, if value-addition has a role
to play, accounting for selection effects will not suppress the statistical sig-
nificance of the syndication variable. Thus, our econometric strategy delivers
simultaneous benefits: apposite estimation with treatment effects and a sep-
aration of the impact of better selection versus value-add by syndicates. It
is undertaken in two stages, one, a model of syndication likelihood and two,
models of performance assessment across the three metrics.
5In order to correct for endogeneity, we first employ an empirical model for
the determinants of syndication to understand why some firms are syndicated
and others are not. We use this model as a first step in the two-step proce-
dure in estimating the impact of syndication on performance. We find that
the probability of syndication is positively related to risk sharing (Wilson
(1968), Bygrave (1987) and Tian (2009)), measured by the membership in IT
or biotech industries and in early stage rounds, and the VC’s skill and specialty
(Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002), Wright and Lockett (2003), and Gom-
pers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2006, 2009)), measured by the industry
specialist lead VC, and the number of portfolio companies the lead VC has
backed. Syndication is more likely when the size of the round is large, when
the lead VC has many portfolio companies, and when the lead VC is Califor-
nia based. Syndication likelihood is inversely associated with the age of the
firm (less risk), the capital under management by the lead VC (fewer capital
constraints), and the presence of an international lead VC (who is more likely
to be already diversified). Location specific variables such as network density
and entropy measures developed in Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2009) are
also associated with the likelihood of VC syndication. We find that the greater
the network density and the lower the entropy of the number of investment
per zip code area in the market, the higher the likelihood of syndication.
Given the model for the likelihood of a venture being syndicated, we impose
endogeneity corrections in the econometric models of performance assessment.
Using a probit model, we find that syndication is positively related to a higher
probability of successful exit. Likewise, using a hazard model, we find that
syndication significantly shortens the time-to-exit of a successful venture. Since
these effects of syndication persist even after correcting for selection effects,
we conclude that value-addition by the syndicate contributes to a more likely
and timely outcome.
While exit multiples for syndicated ventures are significantly higher than those
of non-syndicated ventures without endogeneity controls, this significant re-
lation disappears in the second-stage regressions after we control for endoge-
nous treatment effects. This insignificance is robust across exit by either IPO
or acquisition. Therefore, value-addition effort does not statistically change
the exit multiple for syndicated firms. An implication of our findings is that,
conditional on successful exit, selection effort contributes to better multiples,
whereas value-addition effort by syndicates materializes in higher probabili-
ties of exit and faster exits over and above the selection effect. Hence, value-
addition contributes to success and selection determines the magnitude of the
outcome. We liken this to VC syndicates uncovering diamonds in the rough,
and then polishing them to success.
6Our results are found to be robust irrespective of the stage of investing being
considered. This complete characterization of syndication determinants and
performance is presented as follows. Section 2 describes the data and sample.
Section 3 presents our econometric specification covering models for all three
performance metrics and treatment effects. Section 4 presents the empirical
results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and sample
We obtain our data from Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics (Ventur-
eXpert) database. VentureXpert reports information on private equity invest-
ments of over 6,000 venture capital and private equity firms. Our sample covers
all venture financing rounds of U.S. private firms from 1980 to 2003, and in-
cludes 98,068 financing rounds in 43,658 unique firms. 5 We follow these firms
until there is an exit or until the end of 2003. The information about each exit
is available in the VentureXpert database, which is identified by the Thom-
son Financial Global New Issue database and the Mergers and Acquisitions
database. We concentrate solely on U.S. private firms, observing the most dis-
aggregated view of the data, rather than examine performance at the level of
the VC fund. Our goal in this paper is to understand how syndication deter-
mines the performance of individual round investments of portfolio companies,
not its impact on VC funds or their attendant relationships (see Hochberg,
Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) for a comprehensive examination of the latter view).
Table 1 reports the frequency of financing rounds over time and across in-
dustries. Because exit options for start-up companies are highly cyclical, the
frequency of financing rounds shows cycles in private equity financing. Deal
flow increases from early 1980 to the late 1980s but declines in the early 1990s.
It steadily increases again from 1994 until 2000. The years 1999-2001 show the
highest level of financing with an all time high in the year 2000. The increase
in the late 1990s is largely a function of increased capital commitments to the
so called “new economy” firms, for example, internet, computer software, and
communications business in the internet bubble period. Computer software,
internet, communications, medical/healthcare, and consumer related indus-
tries receive a large portion of available private equity financing. These top
five industry groups account for 60% of the total number of investments. Deal
flow decreases again in the early 2000s, because, as Giot and Schwienbacher
5 As Venture Economic’s data are somewhat unreliable before 1980, we exclude
investments before 1980. See Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), who also choose
their data based on the same considerations.
7(2007) note, market conditions dramatically change in 2001 and 2002 as the
NASDAQ and other stock indices experience sharp corrections.
We index firms in the data set with the variable i, where i = 1, . . . , N . For
each firm there is a set of financing rounds, and these are indexed by variable
j. This notation permits us flexibility in creating variables either at the firm
level or at the level of each financing round.
3 Econometric specification
We follow Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2000), Brander et al (2002), Sorensen
(2007), and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) in viewing a successful exit
as a representation of the venture’s success. Here, we extend the performance
metrics to three distinct ones, exit probabilities, time to exit, and exit mul-
tiples. 6 We anticipate that the role of a VC syndicate in selection versus
value-add might be different for each of the metrics. We believe that this is
the first time in the literature that the role of the VC syndicate has been
examined across different aspects of performance of the venture.
3.1 Probability of exit
Not all venture-backed firms end up making a successful exit, either via an
IPO, through a buyout, or by means of another exit route. By designating
successful exits as Sij = 1, and setting Sij = 0 otherwise, we fit a Probit
model to the data. We define Sij to be based on a latent threshold variable
S∗ij such that
Sij =
 1 if S
∗
ij > 0
0 if S∗ij ≤ 0.
(1)
where the latent variable is modeled as (subscripts suppressed)
S∗ = γ′X + u, u ∼ N(0, σ2u) (2)
6 See Cochrane (2005) for an analysis of firm-level rate of return based on an
alternative database (VentureOne).
8where X is a set of explanatory variables. The estimated model provides us
the probability of exit for all financing rounds.
E(S) = E(S∗ > 0) = E(u > −γ′X) = 1− Φ(−γ′X) = Φ(γ′X), (3)
where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative normal distribution and γ is the vector of
coefficients estimated in the Probit model, using standard likelihood methods.
3.2 Time to exit
It is widely held that the presence of a venture capitalist (Wang, Wang and Lu
(2002)), or the “easy-money” of the internet-bubble period (Giot and Schwien-
bacher (2007)), shortens the time to exit (Venture Economics suggests that
the average time to exit is 4.2 years), but little is known about exit time differ-
entials in syndicated versus non-syndicated ventures. We use a hazard model
specification that allows modeling duration data (Allison (1995)). The time to
exit starts with the round investment date and ends when the venture exits
through an IPO, acquisition or other means. The hazard function is modeled
as:
h(t,X(t)) = h(t, 0) exp[θ′X(t)] (4)
where h(t,X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t and X(t) is a vector of explanatory
variables, including a syndication dummy, that are potentially time varying.
We use a Cox proportional hazard model with right-censoring, and time vary-
ing covariates. Time to exit is expressed in months. The vector of coefficients
in this model is denoted θ.
3.3 Multiples on exit
For the firms that make a successful exit, we are able to compare the exit price
with the buy-in price at the financing round. The ratio of exit price to buy-in
price is the multiple on exit. This computation is done on a per share basis
to correctly account for dilution with each succeeding financing round. Given
that the time to exit varies by firm, we annualize the multiple (denoted Y )
for each firm so as to make proper comparisons across firms. For the purpose
of annualization we follow the procedure outlined in Das, Jagannathan and
9Sarin (2003), which is as follows:
Yannual = [Yraw]
1/t , t = CEIL(days/365)
where the function CEIL rounds up to the next integer. The “raw” multiple
Yraw is the ratio of exit value to buy-in value and is adjusted for the dilution
effect during the financing path. 7 Further, “days” is the number of days to
exit in the model above. We regress exit multiples on a syndication dummy
and control variables.
3.4 Endogenous treatment effects
A regression of venture performance measures on various firm characteristics
and a dummy variable for syndication allows a first pass estimate of whether
syndication impacts performance. However, it may be that syndicated projects
are simply of higher quality and deliver better performance, whether or not
deals are syndicated. It is also possible that non-syndicated deals have better
performance if the lead VC includes all obvious winners and there is no need
for the synergies of syndication. Given that about two-thirds of all investment
rounds are syndicated, despite the non-trivial cost of syndication, we claim
that, on average, superior projects are more likely to be syndicated because
VC syndicates can identify them better than can single VCs . In this case, the
coefficient on the syndication dummy variable might reveal a value-add from
syndication, when indeed, there is none. Hence, we correct the specification
for endogeneity, and then examine whether the syndication dummy remains
significant.
Different methodologies are used across three performance metrics for estimat-
ing endogenous treatment effects. For the exit multiple regressions, we follow
the two-stage procedure based on the structural model suggested in Greene
(1993). We obtain inverse Mill’s ratios separately for the syndicated and non-
syndicated rounds from the first stage probit for syndication choice, and in-
clude them in the second stage regressions. The structural two-stage model for
the endogenous treatment effects may result in inconsistent parameter esti-
mates if the second stage specifications are non-linear such as the probit model
for the exit probability, and the hazard model for the exit time. Hence, for the
exit probability analyses, we estimate a bivariate probit model with two probit
equations: a probit model of syndication choice and another probit model for
7 See Appendix B for a description of how we compute multiples. The approach is
identical to the “cash-in, cash-out” approach.
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exit probability. Like the seemingly unrelated regression model, the bivariate
probit model assumes that the independent, identically distributed errors are
correlated. For the exit time analysis, we use three different approaches to
estimate endogenous treatment effects. Though it may generate inconsistent
parameter estimates, we estimate a two-stage Cox proportional hazard model
by including inverse Mill’s ratios obtained from the first stage probit of syndi-
cation choice. We also estimate two alternate models: a two-stage Tobit model
with right censoring and a two-stage ordinary least squares model to confirm
that the estimates from the two-stage Cox proportional hazard model are not
inconsistent due to the non-linear second stage specification.
4 Empirical analyses
In this section, we assess the performance of syndicated versus non-syndicated
venture investments. We define a round as syndicated if at least one investment
round including the current one is syndicated.
Since we have three performance metrics (exit probabilities, exit times, and
exit multiples), our analyses will be undertaken for each of the metrics. We
use different empirical specifications, from the simplest to the most complex,
presented in each of the following subsections. We begin with descriptive statis-
tics, examine the raw differences in performance, then provide an explanatory
model of syndication, and finally, evaluate performance after correctly ac-
counting for endogenous treatment effects.
4.1 Descriptive performance statistics
4.1.1 Exit probabilities
First, we examine if syndicated ventures are more likely to exit than non-
syndicated ones. Three types of exit are considered here: (a) by IPO, (b) by
acquisition, and (c) by LBO. The results are presented in Table 2 and show
that the probability of exit is higher for syndicated firms, irrespective of the
channel through which exit occurs (significant at the 1% level).
Overall, if we take all three exit routes together, the probability of a syndicated
deal exiting is around 38% whereas that of the non-syndicated deal is 25%,
meaning that there is a 13% higher probability of syndication resulting in an
exit. Comparing exit routes, the difference in probability is more marked for
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exit by acquisition (10% difference in probabilities) than for exit by IPO (3%).
4.1.2 Exit times
Given the evidence that VC syndication increases the probability of a firm
exiting, the interesting question is whether it enhances the speed with which
firms exit as well. The answer to this question is provided in Table 3, which
presents the mean time to exit (in months).
Overall, if we look at all exit routes (IPO, acquisition, or LBO), the mean time
to exit is about 2 months faster for syndicated firms than for non-syndicated
firms (significant at the 5% level). However, this result is driven mainly by
firms that exit by acquisition (more than 3 months faster, significant at the
1% level). For exits by IPO, there does not seem to be a statistically significant
difference in exit times for syndicated and non-syndicated firms, even though
syndicated exits are on average 1 month sooner than non-syndicated exits.
This suggests that syndicates are likely to cut losses and sell off a new venture
when they realize that an IPO is less likely.
4.1.3 Exit multiples
Do syndicated venture investments deliver higher multiples? We begin by ex-
amining the exit multiples for syndicated versus non-syndicated round in-
vestments using the annualized exit multiple (Yannual) defined earlier. The
cumulative distributions of annualized multiple for both syndicated and non-
syndicated financing are displayed in Figure 1. (Note also that these distribu-
tions are conditional ones, i.e. they represent the annualized multiples after
conditioning on syndication, or the absence of syndication). We see that the
syndicated financing distribution is shifted to the right, and after a multiple
level of 2, the exit multiples of syndicated deals’ distribution is fatter-tailed,
i.e. the likelihood of a large multiple is higher for syndicated deals than for
non-syndicated ones.
[Figure 1 about here]
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for annualized multiples. The annualized
multiple for syndicated firms is 2.19 whereas for non-syndicated firms it is
1.79 (the difference is significant at the 1% level), evidence that syndicated
firms yield higher exit outcomes from financing round to exit. A comparison
of the raw exit multiples (not adjusted for time) reveals that non-syndicated
firms provide higher multiples (9.66 versus 6.38, significant at the 5% level).
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However, since these firms take much longer to exit, the multiples are lower
on an annualized basis. This may also be consistent with the evidence that
syndicated deals are more likely to be rushed towards exit, and these results
support this decision given that they provide a higher return on invested
capital. The standard deviation of exit multiples is also higher for syndicated
ventures, suggesting that VC syndicates may be more willing to take on riskier
deals.
We transform the conditional distributions of annualized multiples into syn-
dication probabilities using Bayes’ theorem, conditional on multiples. We are
interested in how the conditional probability of syndication changes as the
multiple level changes. We define the probability of the multiple given that
the financing was syndicated as Pr[Y |S = 1]. Likewise, the probability of the
multiple Y given the firm was not syndicated is Pr[Y |S = 0]. Each of these
may be read from the two probability density functions depicted in the pre-
vious subsection. The probability of a financing being syndicated, denoted
Pr(S = 1), is simply the ratio of the number of syndicated financings to total
financings. We define of course, Pr(S = 0) = 1− Pr(S = 1).
Using Bayes’ theorem, the conditional probability of syndication is as follows:
Pr[S = 1|Y ] = Pr[Y |S = 1] Pr[S = 1]
Pr[Y |S = 1] Pr[S = 1] + Pr[Y |S = 0] Pr[S = 0]
We plot this probability for all values of Y , depicted in Figure 2. We see
that the likelihood of syndication increases in the multiple, implying that
when multiples are high, there is a greater chance that the firm was financed
through syndication. The extent to which this matters is also indicated by the
slope of the plot. Since it is rather steep, performance is well discriminated by
syndication as an explanatory factor.
[Figure 2 about here]
4.2 Determinants of syndication
The decision to syndicate by the lead VC must arise from the benefits of
project selection and value-add through monitoring. There are three types of
information that drive this decision. First, variables relating to the risk and
return of the venture itself. Second, the characteristics of the involved VCs.
Third, the preferences of the entrepreneur. Our data set allows us to focus
on the first two but provides relatively little information in examining the en-
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trepreneur’s motivations for syndication. Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007)
develop a detailed information-based model of the syndication decision. Their
model ignores the preferences of the entrepreneur but models the information
improvement (for the selection decision) by syndication as a trade-off versus
the costs of VC free-riding in the implementation stage and the benefits from
engaged VCs.
Our model relies on a Probit analysis of the syndication decision, as follows:
Pr[Synit|Zit] = Φ[B′Zit]
where Synit is a dummy variable equal to one if venture investment i is a
syndicated venture in year t, and 0 otherwise. Zit is a vector of firm, industry,
or market characteristics at the time of firm i’s syndication. B is a vector of
coefficients.
There are various characteristics of the firm and of the venture capitalist that
lead to a venture being syndicated, and we use a large number of variables
to model the probability of syndication. Based on the previous literature, we
include the following variables as components of Z:
Risk sharing variables
Wilson (1968) and Bygrave (1987) argue that the primary rationale behind
VC syndication is risk sharing. To capture this, we use the following variables.
• Ind: Since the benefits and related risks of syndication are likely to vary
across industries, we include a dummy variable that signifies if the firm lies
in the information technology (IT) or bio-technology industries. These two
industries are known for higher levels of risk and thus we expect such firms
to be syndicated more than those in other industries.
• Erly stg: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in an
early stage or the seed round of financing. Early stage deals are more risky
and more likely to be syndicated.
• Co age: The age (in years) of the venture since its founding to the financing
round. We would expect that firms that are older will be less risky and less
likely to need syndicated financing.
• Num stg: The cumulative number of stages including the current round. As
a venture goes through multiple stages of financing, asymmetric information
about the venture dissipates, and the venture is likely to obtain syndicated
financing.
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Diversification, resource and capital constraint variables
Manigart, et al (2002) and Hopp and Rieder (2006) suggest that portfolio
diversification and resource-driven motives complement the risk mitigation
perspective. Gompers and Lerner (1998) assert that the capital constraints of
a single venture capitalist might force the venture to syndicate. We use the
following variables to address these motives.
• VC intN: An indicator variable with a value of 1 if the lead VC is an interna-
tional VC. The probability of syndication would increase with this variable
if the VC prefers diversification. An international VC is likely to already
be diversified in other markets, and hence the need would be less. Also, an
international VC is less likely to have strong syndication relationships in
the U.S. market, leading to a lower likelihood of syndication.
• VC indF: A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the lead VC is a generalist
and has no specific industry focus. A VC with a broadly diversified portfolio
is less likely to seek syndication.
• Cap mgt: This is the capital under management in all ventures for the lead
VC. We anticipate that if the total capital under management of the lead
VC is small, then the current investment represents a higher proportion
of his layout, and such a VC would have a greater incentive to diversify
his holdings, and thus syndicate more. Hence, an increase in this variable
should result in a decrease in the likelihood of syndication.
• Rd ivst: The total amount invested in the round. The likelihood of syndica-
tion grows with the amount of investment, as the lead VC would want to
avoid investing too much in a single round.
• VC numC: The number of portfolio companies that the lead VC has invested
in. As this increases, the lead VC is more likely to invite other VCs into the
syndication, as this would mitigate being over-invested in any one venture.
VC’s skill and specialty variables
Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002), Wright and Lockett (2003), and Gom-
pers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2006, 2009) suggest that VC syndica-
tion provides a wide range of skills and networks to portfolio companies.
• Late stg: A dummy variable that is 1 if the stage of financing is late. After
controlling for other factors, syndication is less likely to occur in late stages
as the set of VCs in place probably do not need additional input for selection
or value addition.
• VC ind: This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the lead VC
is an industry specialist whose preferred industry is also the same industry
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category in which the venture resides. The lead VC may wish to obtain
additional skills that are not industry specific, thereby increasing the chance
of a syndication; conversely, the lead VC may not need an another opinion
given existing industry expertise.
• Ivst bk: A dummy variable which is 1 if the lead VC is an investment bank,
else 0. An investment bank is much more likely to want to syndicate than
a pure VC, given the lack of focused expertise. Hence, the likelihood of
syndication should increase with this variable.
Strategic stage-based variable
• Str stg: This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the stage of the
financing round is the same as that of the stage preferences of the lead VC.
If the stage is one that the lead VC prefers, then it is less likely that the
round will be syndicated.
Corporate VC variable
• CVC: A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the lead VC is a corporate VC,
else the value of this variable is 0. Cumming (2001) suggests that Corporate
VCs (CVCs) are more likely to seek syndication in order to get second
opinions. In addition, they prefer to diversify their investments, especially if
the investment is in the same industry as the one in which the parent firm
operates.
Geographical location variables
Sorenson and Stuart (2001) suggest that syndication makes the dissemination
of information easier across geographical and industrial boundaries.
• Co state: A dummy variable taking a value 1 if the firm is based in Califor-
nia. Since there is greater access to VCs in California, this makes it more
likely to see a syndicated deal in that state.
• VCstate: A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the VC is from California.
Since there is a greater number of VCs in California, it is easier for VCs
to interact. We expect a positive relation between this variable and the
probability of syndication.
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Network variables
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2009) developed network density variables to
the strength of the networks among venture capitalists in local markets. In
a tightly networked market, it would be easier to find syndicate partners
and expected future reciprocity (Lerner, 1994) is greater and therefore the
likelihood of syndication will be higher. Hochberg et. al. (2009) related two
measures to network density variables: the entropy of the number of invest-
ment per zip code area and the extent of the corporate VC presence in the
local market. The entropy variable measures the opportunity for more frequent
interaction amongst the VCs in the local market. The higher the entropy (dis-
order/dispersion), the less the likelihood of syndication. The Corporate VC
investment variable captures the link between the role of corporate VCs and
the level of networking. We expect that the greater the proportion of Corporate
VC investment in the local market, the higher the likelihood of syndication.
Corporate VCs have narrower expertise and are more likely to rely on other
VCs. Though corporate VCs may also be less likely to syndicate if they invest
only in their areas of expertise. Their diversification motive may be weaker
than that of stand-alone VCs who do not have corporate hedging.
Following Hochberg et. al. (2009), we define local markets based on six broad
industry groups defined by Venture Economics and cross each with either
states or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). We create four network den-
sity measures considering either “directed” or “undirected” network ties, and
either states or MSAs as the market definition. We create two entropy mea-
sures considering either states or MSAs, and two CVC investment variables
again considering either states or MSAs. Therefore we create the total of eight
location specific network variables. Details of the calculations of these variables
are available in Hochberg et. al. (2009).
• Asymden MSA: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incum-
bents that are present in the market, calculated from directed networks
(i.e., conditioning on lead vs. syndicate participant ties) using metropolitan
statistical areas as the market definition.
• Symden MSA: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incumbents
that are present in the market, calculated from undirected networks using
metropolitan statistical areas as the market definition.
• Asymden State: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incum-
bents that are present in the market, calculated from directed networks
using states as the market definition.
• Symden State: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incumbents
that are present in the market, calculated from undirected networks using
states as the market definition.
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• Entropy MSA: the entropy of the number of investments per zip code area
in the market defined based on metropolitan statistical areas. This variable
measures the opportunity for more frequent interaction amongst the VCs
in the local MSA market.
• Entropy State: the entropy of the number of investments per zip code area in
the market defined based on states. This variable measures the opportunity
for more frequent interaction amongst the VCs in the local state market.
• CVC ivst MSA: the fraction of dollars invested by Corporate VCs in the
market defined based on metropolitan statistical areas.
• CVC ivst State: the fraction of dollars invested by Corporate VCs in the
market defined based on states.
We report the results with Asymden MSA, Entropy MSA, and CVC ivst MSA
for the purpose of brevity. We find that the results remain unchanged when
we use other network density, entropy, and CVC investment variables instead.
Market sentiment variable
• Hot mkt: Based on Table 1, we assign an indicator variable with a value of
1 if the year of the round belongs to the periods 1983-1989 or 1995-2000.
Syndication is less desirable in a hot market, as the lead VC bears much
less risk. Furthermore, the lead VC may prefer to retain all the gains.
We estimate the probability of syndication using a Probit model. Results are
presented in Table 5. We estimate three different models with different sets of
explanatory variables, since the data requirement of some explanatory vari-
ables reduces the sample size significantly. Progressing from Model (1) to
Model (3), we eliminate some of the explanatory variables so as to include
more rounds in the analysis.
From Models (1) to (3), we can see that almost all the chosen variables to
measure risk sharing, diversification, resources, and capital constraints, VC’s
skills and other variables such as geographical concerns and market sentiment
are highly significant in explaining the probability of syndication. The risk-
sharing motive for syndication is important. Firms that are in the IT or bio-
tech space are more likely to be syndicated, as are early stage financings. The
likelihood of syndication also increases with the number of stages – it is likely
that the reduction in information asymmetry from being in an advanced stage
helps in bringing together syndicates.
Diversification and resources matter. Syndication increases if the lead VC
seeks a broadly diversified portfolio; it also increases in the number of portfolio
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companies the lead VC invests in. As the capital under management by the
lead VC increases, there is a lower chance of syndication, since the current
investment does not represent a high proportion of the lead VC firm’s portfolio
and therefore, it is less likely to seek partners to share in the venture. In
addition, syndication is less likely if the lead VC is an international VC.
Consistent with Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002), Wright and Lockett
(2003), and Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2006, 2009) who sug-
gest that the VC’s skill and specialty are important factors of firm perfor-
mance, we find that these factors are relevant in determining the likelihood of
VC syndication. Syndication propensity increases if the lead VC is an industry
specialist. If the lead VC is an investment bank, they tend to syndicate more
to get second opinions, and again, the likelihood of a syndication increases.
Variables measuring geographical location and market sentiment are also im-
portant. Investments in ventures based in California are more likely to be
syndicated, and VCs domiciled in California add to this impetus. The lead
VC is less likely to initiate a syndication in a hot venture market, preferring
to retain all the gains. We also find that Corporate VCs tend syndicate more.
If the financing stage is one that the lead VC prefers then, as expected, the
lead VC is less likely to syndicate.
The network variables are also all important determinants of syndication. We
expect to find that network density, measured by asymmetric density within
an MSA increases the likelihood of syndication, and indeed it does. Next, the
higher the entropy (disorder/dispersion), the less the likelihood of syndication.
We expect and find that the relationship of this instrument to the likelihood
of syndication to be negative. Finally, we find that the greater the proportion
of corporate VCs, the higher the likelihood of syndication. We expect this to
be the case because corporate VCs are more likely to rely on other VCs given
that they may only have niche expertise. On the other hand, it may be that
corporate VCs only invest in their areas of expertise and would be less likely
to syndicate. They may also need syndication less since their diversification
motive may be less than that of stand-alone VCs who do not have corporate
backing. Nevertheless, we find that the presence of a corporate VC increases
the likelihood of syndication.
Table 5 shows that the results are consistent across all three Probit specifica-
tions. All the explanatory variables enter the probit model with the right sign
which lends a level of confidence to our specification for syndication choice,
and provides a solid basis for using these variables in subsequent endogeneity
corrections. Because our third model specification retains the most number of
observations, we use this model in the endogeneity corrections in our second
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stage performance analysis regressions. Use of other model specifications does
not change the results reported in the following performance analysis.
Before we proceed onto the analysis of performance, we note the variables in
Table 5 that are employed as instrumental variables: three network variables
(network density, entropy, and CVC investment), four diversification, resource,
and capital constraint variables (international VC indicator, general list VC
indicator, the capital under management, total round investment, and the
VC’s number of portfolio companies) as well as CVC as a lead VC indicator,
and California VC indicator. We included these variables in the information
set Z used for the syndication decision, and specifically excluded them in the
information set X used for assessing syndication performance, so as to satisfy
the exclusion restrictions for the two-stage model employed in our syndication
and performance analysis.
Variables that proxy portfolio diversification and resource driven motives for
syndication as well as variables related to VC’s capital constraints are not
likely related to exit performance variables and therefore these instruments
are likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Though better-networked VCs
experience significantly better fund performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and
Lu, 2007), it is hard to see that the location specific density measures and
entropy measures as well as Corporate VC investment proportion are related
to exit performance. We see wide variations of exit performance in the same
local market that share the same location specific network characteristics.
Therefore network density measures are also likely to satisfy the exclusion
restriction.
The instruments are not weak. We conduct a log-likelihood ratio test and find
that our instruments are collectively strong in all three models.
4.3 Syndication performance
Several studies document that VC syndication is designed for risk sharing and
is a natural mechanism to reduce inherent uncertainty (Wilson (1968), Bygrave
(1987); Chemmanur and Loutskina (2009) assert that uncertainty affects firm
performance in their study of IPOs). Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) and
Wright and Lockett (2003) suggest that VC syndication provides additional
monitoring through syndicate members’ wide range of skills, alliances, and
networks to the portfolio companies. Many studies, such as Lerner (1995),
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), and Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein
(2006, 2008, 2009) maintain that VC’s monitoring, skills, and experience are
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important drivers of firm performance. Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2007)
even suspect that the performance-enhancement of VC networking is simply
experience. Lerner (1995) argues that VCs act as intense monitors of managers
when the need for oversight is higher.
Having developed a robust model for explaining syndication choice, we now
move on to an examination of the impact of syndication on performance. We
control for variables that explain exit performance. Inclusion of these variables
also reduces mis-specification from correlated omitted variables. All variables
are summarized in Appendix A.
We include control variables that proxy for risk (Ind, Erly Stg, Num Stg),
VC’s skill and specialty (Late stg, VC ind, Ivst bk), as well as monitoring
(Mntrfee) which takes a value of one if the lead VC receives monitoring fees.
We include a strategic stage-based variable (Str stg), a geographical location
variable (Co state), and a market sentiment variable (Hot mkt). Gompers and
Lerner (1998) suggest that the performance of ventures with corporate backers
are as successful as independent VCs when there are similarities between the
VC firm’s and portfolio company’s line of business. Thus, we include a dummy
variable for an independent lead VC (IndpnVC). We also include a dummy
variable if the venture’s business is internet-related (Internet) to measure the
impact of internet-related “easy-money” ventures on exit performance.
4.3.1 Exit probabilities
Syndication has a positive impact on the probability of exit. We examine
whether the higher exit probabilities of syndicated ventures come from se-
lection or better monitoring by VC syndicates, by comparing the results with
and without controlling for endogenous selection. Estimation with endogeneity
controls is undertaken by means of a bivariate probit, one probit for syndica-
tion choice and another for exit probability. The results are presented in Table
6. There are four sub-panels in the table, breaking out the results for exit by
different routes. If higher probabilities of exit come strictly from selection,
the impact of syndication on exit probabilities should disappear after control-
ling for endogenous treatment effects. We observe, however, that the impact
remains intact after the endogeneity correction. Hence, the likelihood that a
syndicated venture will exit depends on selection, as well as on monitoring by
the syndicate.
Based on Table 6, we evaluated the increase in exit probability due to syn-
dication by holding other independent variables at their mean values and
looking at the impact of the syndication variable. Because the Probit model
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is non-linear, the increase in probability attributed to syndication versus non-
syndication (i.e., the effect of the coefficient on the syndication dummy) is
dependent on the values of other predictors and the starting values of other
predictors. For exits by acquisition, IPO, or LBO, the increase in exit prob-
ability on account of syndication is 6.22% (we use the estimated coefficient
for regressions without the Mills ratio) after controlling for the effect of other
variables on exit time.
We find higher exit probabilities if ventures are in the IT or bio-tech space,
are in California, and are not in internet-related activities, suggesting that
risk concerns, industry, and spatial location are important to the successful
exit of startups. Exit probabilities are higher for financings in later stages, for
firms that go through a multiple number of financing stages, and for ventures
receiving financing in a hot venture market, implying a role for conditions in
the financing and product markets. Exits are also more likely when the lead
VC is an investment bank or an independent VC, meaning that the type of
VC matters.
For IPOs, syndication and exit probability are negatively (but insignificantly)
correlated without endogeneity control, but positively correlated with endo-
geneity control. It seems that the value-add impact of syndication is greater
for an IPO. While coefficients on the other explanatory variables for IPOs and
acquisitions have the same sign and similar significance, the coefficients on the
early stage variable, monitoring fee variable (Mntrfee), and independent lead
VC (IndpnVC) variable are negative (positive) in IPOs (acquisitions), sug-
gesting that differences in the role of the VC may lead to disparate value-add
outcomes.
4.3.2 Exit times
As already shown in Table 3, the time to exit when a venture investment is
syndicated is less than when it is not syndicated, primarily for exits by ac-
quisition. We examine this effect with a multi-variate analysis controlling for
all other variables. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, we also compare
the results with and without controlling for endogenous treatment effects. 8
Results are provided in Table 7. The coefficients as well as hazard ratios are
reported. A hazard ratio of an independent variable greater (less) than 1 in-
8 Recently, some researchers (Earle et al (2001), Brooks et al (2003)) have used
instrumental variables analysis to evaluate alternative treatments in cancer in the
hazard model context. As a robustness check, we estimate an instrumental variable
model (unreported) and find the same results.
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dicates a shorter (longer) time-to-exit (the ratio is proportional to the speed
of exit). The evidence clearly shows that syndication impacts the time to exit
significantly, with and without the endogeneity correction. Consistent with
the results reported in Table 3, where the time to exit was shorter for syn-
dicated ventures, the hazard ratio for syndication is greater than 1, implying
that after applying various controls, syndicated ventures are 21% more likely
to exit at any given time, taken across all types, though the faster rate of exit
is not significant for IPO exits without endogeneity control.
Ventures tend to have a faster time-to-exit if they are in the IT or bio-tech
space, the internet space, and are in the late stage, showing that type of firm
and stage matter. As expected, the type of VC matters too – exits take shorter
time if the lead VC is independent and take longer when the lead VC receives
monitoring fees, a symptom of lower engagement levels. It is important that
the VC be aligned with the industry as well. Ventures also exit faster when they
receive multiple financing rounds, but not necessarily in hot venture markets.
Syndicated investments take a shorter time to exit through acquisitions with
or without correcting for endogenous treatment effects. For exit through IPOs,
the impact of syndication on time-to-exit is insignificant before controlling for
endogeneity but becomes significant after accounting for endogenous treat-
ment effects. Overall, in exits through IPOs, it is value-add through monitor-
ing that reduces time-to-exit.
To ensure that the results from the two-stage Cox proportional hazard model
are not inconsistent, we also estimate a two-stage Tobit model with right cen-
soring, and a two-stage ordinary least squares (OLS) model. In the Tobit and
OLS estimations, the signs of parameter estimates will be the opposite of those
in the hazard model estimation. The negative coefficient on the syndication
variable in Tobit and OLS estimations represent shorter times to exit. The re-
sults are reported in Panels B and C of Table 7 respectively and are consistent
with those from the Cox proportional hazard model estimation. Bootstrap es-
timation (not reported) of standard errors with 10,000 iterations also provides
results consistent with those reported in Table 7. All our tests confirm that
syndicated deals exit faster.
4.3.3 Exit multiples
In Table 8, we examine if the higher annualized exit multiples achieved by
syndicated ventures shown in Table 4 remain significant after controlling for
other factors, and if these high multiples come from selection or from value-add
by the syndicate. We regress the exit multiple on a syndication dummy and
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various other explanatory variables. We conduct this first without correcting
for endogeneity, and then repeat the exercise with the endogeneity correction.
We find that the variable for syndication is significant (the multiple is greater
by 0.72 before adjusting for industry returns and 0.50 after adjustment) when
no endogeneity correction is imposed, and then becomes insignificant with the
correction. This suggests that better exit multiples come from the selection of
better projects by VC syndicates, and not from value-addition effort.
Exit multiples are lower for ventures with multiple stages of financing. Mul-
tiples are higher if ventures pay monitoring fees to VCs and if the venture’s
business is internet related. Multiples are higher for firms in IT and bio-tech
and during hot markets.
In order to make sure that we control for differential performance across in-
dustry sub-sectors, we expanded our assessment of performance (exit multi-
ples) to using industry adjusted abnormal multiples. Industry adjusted abnor-
mal multiples (abn ann mltp) are calculated as annualized exit multiple for a
round investment minus industry average of exit multiples over the sample pe-
riod. There are six different industry classifications in the Venture Economics
database. The first (second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth) definition classifies firms
into three (6, 10, 18, 69, 575) big industry groups. We use the fifth defini-
tion with 69 industry groups because the last classification with 575 industry
groups reduces usable observations significantly. The results are also shown in
Table 8 and support the results obtained from using the unadjusted multiples.
In Table 9, the effect of selection is examined by exit route. We compare an-
nualized exit multiples both with and without the endogeneity correction, for
exit by acquisition and IPO. Multiples for exit by acquisition are significantly
related to the presence of syndication (Syn), but after correcting for endogene-
ity, the coefficient on the syndication dummy is insignificant, implying that
higher exit multiples on acquisition come from better project choice by VC
syndicates and not from value added after selection. This evidence is consis-
tent with the finding reported in Table 8. Multiples for exit by IPO closely
mirror those by acquisition, implying that VC syndicates do not impact the
exit multiple for IPOs after correcting for endogeneity. This evidence also is
consistent with the finding reported in Table 8. Multiples for exit by IPO
closely mirror those by acquisition, implying that VC syndicates do not im-
pact the exit multiple for IPOs after correcting for endogeneity. To the extent
that our sample of annualized exit multiples from the VentureXpert database
properly represents the entire population of exit multiples, the evidence based
upon the endogeneity adjustment is consistent with the selection hypothesis
rather than the value-add one.
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To gauge the representativeness of our sample, we conduct out-of-sample fore-
casts of exit multiples. We use out-of-sample data for firms that did not report
exit valuations, but for which the fact of syndication or non-syndication is re-
ported. We applied the estimated models to the variables of these firms to see
whether the expected (forecast) annualized multiples of these firms is higher
for ventures that were syndicated relative to those that were not. The re-
sults shown in Table 10 imply that syndicated firms have a forecast multiple
that is much higher. The mean annualized multiple is 1.98 versus 1.35 for
non-syndicated firms, and the difference is highly significant.
4.4 Robustness test
As a robustness check we examine the same questions as we asked before, but
restrict the sample to first round financings. We rerun the probit analysis for
the determinants of syndication to see if the coefficients on the explanatory
variables that we used change with the first round only sub-sample in com-
parison to the full sample containing all financing rounds. In the first-round
only sub-sample analysis, Erly stg, Late stg, and Num stg are not included.
Since no investment bank is a lead underwriter for the first round investment,
Ivst bk is also not included in the first round analysis. The result is reported
in Table 11, Panel A, and correspond to the model (3) estimated in Table
5. We can see that the selection model is a robust specification that applies
to first-round financings. Though positive, we find that the coefficient on the
network density is insignificant. The coefficient on entropy and corporate VC
investment proportions are significant with the same signs as in Table 5.
Next, we also evaluate the models for syndication performance for first-rounds,
redoing the analyses for all three performance metrics, i.e. exit probability,
time-to-exit, and exit multiple. Table 11, Panel B presents the signs of the
coefficients on the syndication dummy for these analyses, that relate to the
models estimated in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9. The results are consistent irrespective
of whether we estimate the models for all rounds, or the first round only. In-
significant coefficients in the exit multiples regressions with industry adjusted
abnormal multiples are most likely on account of the smaller sample sizes.
5 Conclusions
Using an effort-sharing framework, we undertake a comprehensive examina-
tion of 98,068 financing rounds of U.S. venture firms from Thomson Finan-
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cial’s Venture Economics (VentureXpert) database (1980-2003). Risk sharing,
portfolio diversification, resources, capital constraints, and VC’s skills, and
specialty are found to be important rationales behind VC syndication. We
complement and extend the existing literature by analyzing the performance
of syndicated ventures not only using returns (i.e. exit multiples), but also us-
ing exit likelihood and the speed of exit. Hence, we provide a three-way metric
for assessing the benefits of syndication. Our results attribute improved multi-
ples to the selection efforts of the syndicate, and more likely and timely exit to
value-addition along with selection effort. Therefore, using multiple metrics of
performance shows that the two canonical hypotheses in the literature overlap
and that the role of VC syndicates is multifaceted.
One caveat is that a significant relation between syndication and our perfor-
mance metrics does not necessarily imply that any VC who chooses not to
syndicate is behaving irrationally. A majority manager of a private venture
firm or a VC firm can rationally measure private benefits of syndication vs.
related costs of syndication. A future study with better data may be able to
examine the choice against syndication.
Our endogeneity controlled evidence suggests that in general, syndicated ven-
tures have higher exit probabilities, faster time-to-exit, and indifferent exit
multiples. While the previous literature is not definite about the relative im-
portance of the selection explanation or the value-added hypothesis in ex-
plaining syndicated venture performance, our results show that selection con-
tributes to the magnitude of exit multiples and value-add after selection con-
tributes to the probability and speed of success. We liken this to VC syndicates
uncovering diamonds in the rough, and then polishing them to success.
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Appendix
A Variable definitions
We present here the variables used in all the analyses in the paper, so as to
make referencing the Tables easier.
• ann mltp = annualized multiples
• Cap mgt = the lead VC’s capital under management in all ventures
• Co age = the age (in years) of the venture since its founding to the financing
round.
• Co state = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is based in
California, and 0 otherwise.
• CVC = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lead VC is a corporate
VC, and 0 otherwise
• Erly stg = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the company is in ’early’
or ’seed’ stage, and 0 otherwise
• Exit 1 = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if exited through IPO,
Acquisition, or LBO, and 0 otherwise
• Exit 2 = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if exited through IPO or
Acquisition, and 0 otherwise
• Exit ACQ = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if exited through Ac-
quisition, and 0 otherwise
• Exit IPO = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if exited through IPO, 0
otherwise
• Hot mkt = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the year of the financing
round belongs to 1983-1999 or 1995-2000, and 0 otherwise
• Ind = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the company is in information
technology or biotech industry, and 0 otherwise
• IndpnVC = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lead VC is inde-
pendent VC, 0 otherwise.
• Internet = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 If the venture’s business
is internet-related, 0 otherwise
• Ivst bk = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lead VC is an invest-
ment bank, and 0 otherwise
• lambda = inverse Mill’s ratio estimated from the first stage probit model of
syndication choice, separately for syndicated and non-syndicated rounds
• Late stg = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the stage of financing
is late stage, 0 otherwise
• Mntrfee = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there exist monitoring
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fee or advising fee for lead VC, 0 otherwise
• Num stg = The cumulative number of stages including the current round
• Rd ivst = The total amount invested in the round
• Str stg = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the stage of the financing
round is the same as that of the stage preferences of the lead VC, and 0
otherwise
• Syn = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if at least one round including
the current round is syndicated, and 0 otherwise
• VC ind = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lead VC is an industry
specialist whose preferred industry is also the same industry category in
which the firm resides, and 0 otherwise. The lead VC is the investor whose
cumulative investment including the current round is the greatest.
• VC indf = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lead VC is a generalist
and has no specific industry focus, and 0 otherwise
• VC intN = A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the lead VC is an
international VC, and 0 otherwise
• VC numC = The number of companies that the lead VC has invested in.
• VCstate = A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the VC is from Cali-
fornia, and 0 otherwise
• Asymden MSA: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incum-
bents that are present in the market, calculated from directed networks
(i.e., conditioning on lead vs. syndicate participant ties) using metropolitan
statistical areas as the market definition.
• Symden MSA: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incumbents
that are present in the market, calculated from undirected networks using
metropolitan statistical areas as the market definition.
• Asymden State: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incum-
bents that are present in the market, calculated from directed networks
using states as the market definition.
• Symden State: the proportion of all logically possible ties among incumbents
that are present in the market, calculated from undirected networks using
states as the market definition.
• Entropy MSA: the entropy of the number of investments per zip code area
in the market defined based on metropolitan statistical areas. This variable
measures the opportunity for more frequent interaction amongst the VCs
in the local MSA market.
• Entropy State: the entropy of the number of investments per zip code area in
the market defined based on states. This variable measures the opportunity
for more frequent interaction amongst the VCs in the local state market.
• CVC ivst MSA: the fraction of dollars invested by Corporate VCs in the
market defined based on metropolitan statistical areas.
• CVC ivst State: the fraction of dollars invested by Corporate VCs in the
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market defined based on states.
B Calculating multiples
Our approach to calculating multiples is best explained with a simple example.
We assume that the first round investors start the firm with an investment of
10. Then there is a second round where the new investment is 20, with an ex-
post valuation of 50. And finally, there is an IPO round at which new money
of 30 is invested and the valuation at IPO is 120. The sequence of rounds is
depicted in the following table:
New Investment Post-Money Investor Investor Investor
Round Investment Valuation in Round 1 in Round 2 in Round 3
1st 10 10 100% - -
2nd 20 50 60% 40% -
3rd/IPO 30 120 45% 30% 25%
Cash In 10 20 30
Cash Out 54 36 30
Multiple 5.4 1.8 1.0
(1) The first-round investment is 10, and so, the first-round investors own
100% of the company at the end of the first round.
(2) The second-round financing is 20 with a post-money valuation of 50.
The second-round investors paid in 20 and their stake is 20/50 = 40%.
Therefore, the shares of ownership at the second round are 60% (first-
round investors) and 40% (second-round investors).
(3) At IPO, the company raised extra capital of 30 from third-round in-
vestors. The IPO is sold at 120. Therefore, the third-round investors own
30/120 = 25% of the company. The remaining 75% of the firm is shared
by the first-round and second-round investors in the ratio of 60:40, respec-
tively. Hence, the share of the first-round investors at IPO is 60%×75% =
45%. The share of the second-round investors is 40%× 75% = 30%. The
total shares of investors in the first, second and IPO rounds is 45%, 30%,
and 25%, respectively. In cash terms, their shares are 54, 36, and 30,
respectively.
(4) Finally, the multiples may be computed on a “cash-in, cash-out” basis,
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i.e., divide the cash-out amount for each investor by the amount invested.
This is shown in the table above and leads to multiples of 5.4, 1.8, and
1.0, respectively, for the three rounds of investors.
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Table 1  
Frequency of Financing Rounds 
 
1980-1991              
Industry sector 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  
Agr/Forestr/Fish 1 9 13 13 10 12 11 9 9 12 6 10  
Biotechnology 25 46 58 72 64 80 112 145 157 155 150 147  
Business Serv. 23 24 40 39 37 34 55 68 81 68 65 41  
Communications 52 124 150 217 260 260 273 321 274 279 243 223  
Computer Hardware 114 193 300 375 392 304 290 278 257 250 197 136  
Computer Other 1 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 7 9 9 10  
Computer Software 20 55 126 238 283 279 296 295 272 315 355 337  
Construction 5 11 3 16 10 15 18 16 24 31 19 14  
Consumer Related 54 70 118 139 137 178 214 279 388 384 301 191  
Financial Services 19 20 37 27 23 36 58 84 89 106 93 143  
Industrial/Energy 106 181 206 181 174 171 212 231 240 253 228 160  
Internet Specific 1 2 3 10 6 6 17 20 25 21 24 22  
Manufact. 16 27 67 57 65 34 64 85 116 155 99 68  
Medical/Health 50 67 102 160 202 222 224 314 278 338 317 247  
Other 3 9 17 10 7 6 7 2 5 11 7 12  
Semiconductor/Electr 82 116 129 163 231 215 208 229 210 203 179 129  
Transportation 16 13 23 20 24 23 36 45 54 51 41 33  
Utilities 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 5 7 6 6  
Total 589 969 1396 1740 1930 1880 2099 2426 2491 2648 2339 1929  
              
1992-2003              
Industry sector 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Agr/Forestr/Fish 6 11 15 17 19 22 57 21 38 35 26 31 413 
Biotechnology 192 187 203 217 293 321 372 314 550 523 427 553 5363 
Business Serv. 45 47 51 78 123 129 215 295 481 372 200 244 2855 
Communications 315 287 314 382 562 582 753 837 1567 1140 708 771 10894 
Computer Hardware 156 107 120 155 198 192 218 256 513 329 213 258 5801 
Computer Other 13 8 3 7 5 10 13 17 31 33 11 20 229 
Computer Software 402 345 369 523 847 1009 1238 1646 2636 1869 1351 1425 16531 
Construction 10 12 18 27 52 53 71 61 88 85 47 101 807 
Consumer Related 235 240 284 376 540 550 696 574 774 659 427 568 8376 
Financial Services 113 134 148 170 386 252 306 268 485 525 243 353 4118 
Industrial/Energy 191 153 168 215 362 335 414 347 466 419 312 476 6201 
Internet Specific 36 32 62 175 428 606 943 2876 5468 2390 1143 929 15245 
Manufact. 75 76 76 104 140 132 196 181 286 220 147 187 2673 
Medical/Health 371 295 328 392 610 663 726 668 854 788 670 845 9731 
Other 12 13 9 28 35 31 92 56 60 66 53 166 717 
Semiconductor/Electr 155 139 132 175 234 276 352 374 787 594 457 562 6331 
Transportation 36 36 39 63 83 98 143 123 185 167 92 157 1601 
Utilities 5 6 3 6 6 10 15 10 23 22 18 27 182 
Total 2368 2128 2342 3110 4923 5271 6820 8924 15292 10236 6545 7673 98068 
 
Notes. This table reports the frequency of financing rounds over time and across industries. The frequency of 
financing rounds shows cycles in private equity financing. 
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Table 2  
Exit Probabilities for Syndicated and Non-syndicated Rounds  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Variable N Mean Std Dev 
Non-syndicated Rounds Exit by IPO, Acq, or LBO 32801 0.2477 0.4317 
 Exit by IPO or Acq 32801 0.2367 0.4250 
 Exit by Acq 32801 0.1160 0.3202 
 Exit by IPO 32801 0.1207 0.3258 
     
Syndicated Rounds Exit by IPO, Acq, or LBO 63743 0.3791 0.4852 
 Exit by IPO or Acq 63743 0.3716 0.4832 
 Exit by Acq 63743 0.2203 0.4145 
 Exit by IPO 63743 0.1513 0.3583 
          
 
Panel B: Test for difference in means of syndicated vs. non-syndicated rounds 
 
 Variable  t value Pr>|t| 
 Exit by IPO, Acq, or LBO -42.92 <0.0001 
 Exit by IPO or Acq -44.56 <0.0001 
 Exit by Acq -43.26 <0.0001 
 Exit by IPO -13.34 <0.0001 
 
Notes. We consider three types of exits: by IPO, by Acquisition or by LBO. The table shows the proportion of 
rounds exiting by means of these routes. Syndicated rounds are those that have at least one round syndicated 
including the current round. A T-test is used to test the difference of means between syndicated and non-syndicated 
rounds. 
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Table 3 
Exit Times for Syndicated and Non-syndicated Rounds 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Variable N Mean Std Dev 
Non-syndicated Rounds Time to Exit 2770 43.87 35.69 
 Time to Exit by IPO 641 37.52 32.82 
 Time to Exit by Acq 1937 47.14 35.51 
     
Syndicated Rounds Time to Exit 10539 42.22 36.72 
 Time to Exit by IPO 2544 36.64 32.52 
 Time to Exit by Acq 7704 44.03 37.04 
          
 
Panel B: Test for difference in means of syndicated vs. non-syndicated rounds 
 
 Variable   t value Pr>|t| 
 Time to Exit  2.15 0.0318 
 Time to Exit by IPO  0.61 0.5398 
 Time to Exit by Acq  3.42 0.0006 
 
Notes. Firms can exit in three routes: by IPO, by Acquisition, and by LBO. We consider all exits, and exits by IPO, 
or by Acquisition separately. The table shows the time to exit (in months) of rounds exiting by means of these 
routes. Syndicated rounds are those that have at least one round syndicated including the current round. A T-test is 
used to test the difference of means between syndicated and non-syndicated rounds. 
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Table 4  
Exit Multiples of Syndicated and Non-Syndicated Rounds 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Non-syndicated Rounds Raw multiple 142 9.66 16.97 0.01 91.38 
 Annualized Multiple 142 1.79 1.43 0.21 9.39 
       
Syndicated Rounds Raw multiple 1305 6.38 12.67 0.00 91.38 
 Annualized Multiple 1289 2.19 2.48 0.09 15.82 
 
 
Panel B: Test for difference in means of syndicated vs. non-syndicated rounds 
 
 Variable   t value Pr>|t|   
 Raw multiple  2.24 0.0264   
 Annualized Multiple  -2.92 0.0039   
 
Notes. This table shows the payoff to all rounds depending on whether they were syndicated or not. The statistics are 
presented for raw multiples as well as annualized multiples. The raw multiple is the value at exit divided by the 
value at investment. Annualized multiples are computed as the raw multiple taken to the n-th root, where n is the 
rounded up number of years from the time of investment to exit. Multiples are rounded at the 1 percent and 99 
percent levels. Syndicated rounds are those that have at least one round syndicated including the current round. A T-
test is used to test the difference of means between syndicated and non-syndicated rounds. 
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Table 5  
The Determinants of Syndication  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. This table presents probit regressions to explain the likelihood of syndication. A coefficient of x for an independent variable indicates that a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable results in a x standard deviation increase in the predicted probit index. Multiplying the probit estimates by 1.6 gives the 
rough estimates of the logit slope estimates. The odds ratio in the logit model independent variable is calculated as exp(the logit slope estimates).  See the 
definitions of variables in Appendix A.  
    Model (1)      Model (2)      Model (3))   
Independent  Coefficient       Chi- Pr > Chi-  Coefficient       Chi- Pr > Chi-  Coefficient       Chi- Pr > Chi- 
variables   estimates  square square  estimates  square square  estimates  square square 
             
Intercept  -2.9584 2308.49 <.0001  -2.7979 3157.24 <.0001  -3.2199 6212.38 <.0001 
Ind   0.3904 504.97 <.0001  0.3170 435.37 <.0001  0.3757 903.40 <.0001 
Erly_stg   0.1385 59.90 <.0001  0.1574 104.66 <.0001  0.1826 213.55 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg) 1.9069 3145.27 <.0001  1.9195 4151.53 <.0001  2.0125 5802.08 <.0001 
VC_intN  -0.2816 169.37 <.0001  -0.2884 216.79 <.0001  -0.2615 252.26 <.0001 
VC_indF  -0.1281 39.07 <.0001  -0.0700 22.76 <.0001  -0.0547 18.94 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Rd_ivst) 0.2049 2177.49 <.0001  0.1817 2555.41 <.0001  0.1926 3990.52 <.0001 
Ln(1+VC_numC) 0.1891 483.15 <.0001  0.0772 523.12 <.0001  0.0871 900.40 <.0001 
Late_stg  -0.0579 7.56 0.0060  -0.0239 1.66 0.1979  0.0098 0.38 0.5371 
VC_ind  0.0427 3.73 0.0535  0.0753 12.46 0.0004  0.0765 17.27 <.0001 
Ivst_bk  0.7713 528.92 <.0001  0.7746 659.76 <.0001  0.7798 869.01 <.0001 
Str_stg  -0.1494 48.80 <.0001  -0.1732 69.88 <.0001  -0.1205 45.37 <.0001 
CVC  0.0951 5.72 0.0168  0.1588 27.92 <.0001  0.1918 52.14 <.0001 
Co_state  0.1895 92.23 <.0001  0.1119 45.93 <.0001  0.1369 89.27 <.0001 
VCstate 0.1070 27.13 <.0001  0.1909 100.25 <.0001  0.1539 87.08 <.0001 
Asymden_MSA 0.0600 11.08 0.0009  0.0448 0.01 0.0017  0.0419 12.61 0.0004 
Entropy_MSA -0.0416 32.43 <.0001  -0.0460 0.01 <.0001  -0.0515 94.64 <.0001 
CVC_ivst_MSA 0.7141 44.96 <.0001  0.5697 0.09 <.0001  0.7900 96.23 <.0001 
Hot_mkt  -0.1478 96.36 <.0001  -0.1813 188.33 <.0001  -0.1505 182.46 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Co_age) -0.0224 8.39 0.0038  -0.0179 7.01 0.0081     
Ln(1+ Cap_mgt ) -0.0912 260.93 <.0001         
Log Likelihood  -20,815    -27,404    -37,614  
Wald Chi-square  9,236    11,383    16,788  
Pr > Wald Chi-square  <.0001    <.0001    <.0001  
Cox and Snell R-square  0.2382    0.2209    0.2563  
Nagelkerke Max-rescaled R-square  0.3561    0.3352    0.3669  
Number of observations  49,963    66,327    83,309  
 Syndicated 37,904 75.9%  Syndicated 51,142 77.1%  Syndicated 59,387 71.3% 
 Non-syn 12,059 24.1%  Non-syn 15,185 22.9%  Non-syn 23,922 28.7% 
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Table 6  
The Effect of Syndication on Exit Probabilities 
 
    Depvariable = Exit_1 (IPO, ACQ, LBO)       Dep variable = Exit_2 (IPO,ACQ)    
  without Endogeneity control  with Endogeneity control – biprobit estimation  without Endogeneity control  
with Endogeneity control 
– biprobit estimation 
Independent  Coefficient Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Coefficient t-value Pr > t-  
Coefficien
t Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Coefficient t-value Pr > t- 
variables   estimates   square  estimates   value  estimates   square  estimates   value 
                 
Intercept  -1.0946 2619.64 <.0001  -1.1295 -53.94 <.0001  -1.1745 2978.75 <.0001  -1.2068 -57.23 <.0001 
Syn  0.1707 226.08 <.0001  0.8124 30.37 <.0001  0.1636 205.66 <.0001  0.7830 28.54 <.0001 
Ind  0.2469 416.35 <.0001  0.1414 11.11 <.0001  0.2772 518.32 <.0001  0.1748 13.58 <.0001 
Erly_stg  -0.1314 134.31 <.0001  -0.1559 -13.93 <.0001  -0.1208 112.93 <.0001  -0.1452 -12.93 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg) 0.3377 322.08 <.0001  0.0219 0.96 0.3355  0.3800 405.95 <.0001  0.0743 3.22 0.0013 
Late_stg  0.1668 174.24 <.0001  0.1397 11.19 <.0001  0.1015 63.61 <.0001  0.0785 6.24 <.0001 
VC_ind  -0.0032 0.04 0.8391  0.0115 0.75 0.4543  -0.0040 0.0664 0.7967  0.0102 0.66 0.5091 
Ivst_bk  0.1943 162.54 <.0001  0.1152 7.46 <.0001  0.1883 152.06 <.0001  0.1124 7.25 <.0001 
Str_stg  -0.0574 11.17 0.0008  -0.0076 -0.45 0.6558  -0.0708 16.71 <.0001  -0.0222 -1.29 0.1977 
Co_state  0.1899 326.19 <.0001  0.1314 12.30 <.0001  0.1960 346.81 <.0001  0.1398 13.05 <.0001 
Hot_mkt  0.2525 687.92 <.0001  0.2574 27.15 <.0001  0.2580 712.43 <.0001  0.2628 27.58 <.0001 
Mntrfee  -0.0312 5.40 0.0201  -0.0189 -1.47 0.1417  -0.0405 8.98 0.0027  -0.0287 -2.20 0.0276 
IndpnVC  0.0254 5.30 0.0213  0.0129 1.21 0.2261  0.0364 10.77 0.0010  0.0243 2.26 0.0237 
Internet  -0.3986 1484.40 <.0001  -0.4003 -40.12 <.0001  -0.3999 1486.93 <.0001  -0.4024 -40.12 <.0001 
                 
Number of observations 81,989    81,989    81,989    81,989  
Log Likelihood  -50,639    -87,425    -50,197    -87,008  
Wald Chi-
square  5,132        5,235      
Pr > Wald Chi-square <.0001        <.0001      
Cox and Snell R-square 0.0632        0.0646      
Nagelkerke Max-rescaled R-
square 0.0869        0.0891      
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Table 6 (continued) 
  
    Dependent variable = Exit_ACQ       Dependent variable = Exit_IPO    
  without Endogeneity control  with Endogeneity control – biprobit estimation  without Endogeneity control  
with Endogeneity control 
– biprobit estimation 
Independent  Coefficient Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Coefficient t-value Pr > t-  
Coefficien
t Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Coefficient t-value Pr > t- 
variables   estimates   square  estimates   value  estimates   square  estimates   value 
                 
Intercept  -1.7747 5208.40 <.0001  -1.7897 -73.02 <.0001  -1.1969 2359.56 <.0001  -1.2193 -50.21 <.0001 
Syn  0.2390 330.30 <.0001  0.7560 22.76 <.0001  -0.0018 0.0187 0.8912  0.4575 13.08 <.0001 
Ind  0.2658 367.69 <.0001  0.1826 12.34 <.0001  0.1232 75.61 <.0001  0.0536 3.60 0.0003 
Erly_stg  0.0443 12.21 0.0005  0.0207 1.64 0.1007  -0.2437 317.95 <.0001  -0.2609 -19.30 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg) 0.3571 299.88 <.0001  0.0991 3.70 0.0002  0.1445 43.52 <.0001  -0.0830 -2.96 0.0031 
Late_stg  0.1076 58.44 <.0001  0.0922 6.61 <.0001  0.0349 5.78 0.0162  0.0189 1.31 0.1897 
VC_ind  -0.0344 3.87 0.0492  -0.0225 -1.30 0.1937  0.0326 3.14 0.0764  0.0427 2.35 0.0190 
Ivst_bk  0.0628 14.38 0.0001  0.0022 0.13 0.8965  0.1839 115.65 <.0001  0.1244 7.04 <.0001 
Str_stg  -0.0287 2.17 0.1410  0.0109 0.56 0.5755  -0.0801 14.52 0.0001  -0.0458 -2.18 0.0290 
Co_state  0.1796 246.53 <.0001  0.1348 11.52 <.0001  0.0852 47.27 <.0001  0.0473 3.75 0.0002 
Hot_mkt  0.2119 383.64 <.0001  0.2177 20.38 <.0001  0.1493 172.32 <.0001  0.1572 13.97 <.0001 
Mntrfee  0.0261 3.02 0.0821  0.0345 2.35 0.0186  -0.0915 32.05 <.0001  -0.0815 -5.15 <.0001 
IndpnVC  0.0888 50.01 <.0001  0.0778 6.32 <.0001  -0.0419 10.68 0.0011  -0.0479 -3.80 0.0001 
Internet  -0.2952 659.52 <.0001  -0.3048 -27.13 <.0001  -0.2758 496.00 <.0001  -0.2854 -23.57 <.0001 
                                 
                 
Number of observations 81,989    81,989    81,989    81,989  
Log Likelihood  -38,874    -75,800    -33,946    -70,900  
Wald Chi-
square  3,253        1,699      
Pr > Wald Chi-square <.0001        <.0001      
Cox and Snell R-square 0.0404        0.0209      
Nagelkerke Max-rescaled R-
square 0.0644        0.0366      
 
Notes. In this table we present a model to explain the exit probabilities. The table contains two regressions. First, we provide the results without the endogeneity 
correction, and second, with the endogeneity correction. The results with the endogeneity correction are obtained through biprobit estimation of the syndication 
determination equation and the exit probabiilty esquation. The log liklihood in the biprobit estimation is the log likelihood of the system. The variable "Syn" is 
the dummy variable for whether the venture is syndicated or not. Syn in the analysis with endogeneity control is the predicted probability of syndication 
estimated by a first stage probit. Results are provided broken down by IPO and by ACQ (acquisition) routes. See the definitions of variables in Appendix A.
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Table 7  
The Effect of Syndication on Time-to-exit 
 
Panel A: Hazard Model analysis 
                 
    Time-to-Exit through IPO, Acquisition, or LBO     Time-to-Exit through IPO or Acquisition  
  
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
   
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
  
Independent  Hazard Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Hazard Chi-square Pr > Chi-  
Hazar
d Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Hazard Chi-square Pr > Chi- 
variables   ratio   square  ratio   square  ratio   square  ratio   square 
                 
Syn  1.211 150.97 <.0001  3.796 880.63 <.0001  1.207 141.78 <.0001  3.771 850.44 <.0001 
Ind  1.360 380.26 <.0001  1.162 81.51 <.0001  1.405 448.27 <.0001  1.201 116.72 <.0001 
Erly_stg  0.742 397.64 <.0001  0.704 541.22 <.0001  0.749 367.64 <.0001  0.711 505.25 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg)  1.428 235.35 <.0001  0.873 21.65 <.0001  1.480 280.79 <.0001  0.906 11.07 0.0009 
Late_stg  1.119 53.71 <.0001  1.102 39.78 <.0001  1.077 22.12 <.0001  1.061 14.22 0.0002 
VC_ind  1.060 8.14 0.0043  1.069 10.80 0.0010  1.058 7.70 0.0055  1.068 10.25 0.0014 
Ivst_bk  1.093 24.78 <.0001  0.970 2.74 0.0981  1.085 20.67 <.0001  0.965 3.72 0.0536 
Str_stg  1.083 11.23 0.0008  1.151 34.96 <.0001  1.073 8.59 0.0034  1.142 30.18 <.0001 
Co_state  1.018 1.94 0.1635  0.951 14.87 0.0001  1.024 3.31 0.0690  0.956 11.47 0.0007 
Hot_mkt  0.975 3.41 0.0649  1.001 0.00 0.9492  0.980 2.12 0.1455  1.006 0.18 0.6686 
Mntrfee  0.943 11.37 0.0007  0.958 5.87 0.0154  0.928 17.75 <.0001  0.943 10.86 0.0010 
IndpnVC  1.134 76.48 <.0001  1.117 58.92 <.0001  1.149 91.41 <.0001  1.132 72.53 <.0001 
Internet  1.947 2001.60 <.0001  1.886 1799.98 <.0001  1.960 2012.25 <.0001  1.899 1813.07 <.0001 
lambda      0.473 762.62 <.0001      0.474 740.14 <.0001 
                                 
                 
Number of observations 81,716    81,716    81,716    81,716  
Percent censored  64.65%    64,65%    65.26%    65.26%  
Wald Chi-square  5,114    5,652    5,270    5,780  
Pr > Wald Chi-square <.0001    <.0001    <.0001    <.0001  
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 Table 7 (continued) 
  
    Time-to-Exit through Acquisition       Time-to-Exit through IPO    
  
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
   
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
  
Independent  Hazard Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Hazard Chi-square Pr > Chi-  
Hazar
d Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Hazard Chi-square Pr > Chi- 
variables   ratio   square  ratio   square  ratio   square  ratio   square 
                 
Syn  1.429 261.63 <.0001  4.401 554.50 <.0001  0.998 0.01 0.9427  3.190 307.10 <.0001 
Ind  1.545 380.76 <.0001  1.325 143.57 <.0001  1.266 103.03 <.0001  1.078 9.25 0.0024 
Erly_stg  0.914 20.81 <.0001  0.869 49.63 <.0001  0.573 559.94 <.0001  0.542 666.52 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg)  1.706 296.22 <.0001  1.059 2.13 0.1442  1.242 36.80 <.0001  0.746 43.17 <.0001 
Late_stg  1.131 33.54 <.0001  1.119 27.97 <.0001  1.012 0.25 0.6200  0.992 0.13 0.7198 
VC_ind  1.004 0.02 0.8963  1.014 0.26 0.6134  1.134 16.65 <.0001  1.141 18.26 <.0001 
Ivst_bk  1.013 0.28 0.5983  0.910 14.70 0.0001  1.187 40.90 <.0001  1.041 2.15 0.1424 
Str_stg  1.099 8.88 0.0029  1.175 25.67 <.0001  1.042 1.25 0.2644  1.101 6.70 0.0096 
Co_state  1.077 19.00 <.0001  1.007 0.17 0.6830  0.955 5.25 0.0220  0.890 32.15 <.0001 
Hot_mkt  1.018 0.91 0.3393  1.042 5.11 0.0239  0.940 9.28 0.0023  0.967 2.76 0.0965 
Mntrfee  0.989 0.23 0.6295  1.003 0.02 0.8950  0.854 32.98 <.0001  0.870 25.56 <.0001 
IndpnVC  1.263 136.71 <.0001  1.244 119.11 <.0001  1.026 1.43 0.2314  1.011 0.27 0.6066 
Internet  1.807 899.33 <.0001  1.751 798.68 <.0001  2.176 1140.97 <.0001  2.109 1043.39 <.0001 
lambda      0.478 378.86 <.0001      0.467 363.29 <.0001 
                                 
                 
Number of observations 81,716    81,716    81,716    81,716  
Percent censored  80.39%    80.39%    84.87%    84.87%  
Wald Chi-square  3,374    3,568    2,525    2,845  
Pr > Wald Chi-square <.0001    <.0001    <.0001    <.0001  
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Table 7 (continued) 
  
Panel B: Tobit analysis 
                 
    Time-to-Exit through IPO, Acquisition, or LBO     Time-to-Exit through IPO or Acquisition  
  
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
   
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
  
Independent  Estimate Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Estimate Chi-square Pr > Chi-  
Estimat
e Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Estimate Chi-square Pr > Chi- 
variables      square     square     square     square 
                 
Intercept  5.5838 51060.00 <.0001  5.7329 50754.70 <.0001  5.6544 51643.30 <.0001  5.8024 51255.30 <.0001 
Syn  -0.1682 163.85 <.0001  -1.1103 873.62 <.0001  -0.1632 152.81 <.0001  -1.0974 844.86 <.0001 
Ind  -0.2653 371.82 <.0001  -0.1347 86.25 <.0001  -0.2943 451.61 <.0001  -0.1648 127.54 <.0001 
Erly_stg  0.2964 518.39 <.0001  0.3414 679.82 <.0001  0.2874 487.75 <.0001  0.3322 643.81 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg)  -0.2965 200.66 <.0001  0.1160 20.28 <.0001  -0.3283 244.86 <.0001  0.0810 9.83 0.0017 
Late_stg  -0.1221 75.58 <.0001  -0.0967 47.71 <.0001  -0.0782 30.52 <.0001  -0.0538 14.52 0.0001 
VC_ind  -0.0509 8.20 0.0042  -0.0666 14.11 0.0002  -0.0489 7.56 0.006  -0.0650 13.42 0.0002 
Ivst_bk  -0.1036 39.07 <.0001  -0.0031 0.03 0.8521  -0.0977 34.51 <.0001  0.0011 0.00 0.9472 
Str_stg  -0.0266 1.75 0.1865  -0.0840 17.23 <.0001  -0.0176 0.76 0.3837  -0.0747 13.45 0.0002 
Co_state  -0.0514 19.24 <.0001  0.0132 1.24 0.2652  -0.0556 22.57 <.0001  0.0082 0.48 0.4874 
Hot_mkt  0.1848 272.62 <.0001  0.1657 219.89 <.0001  0.1776 250.16 <.0001  0.1590 201.16 <.0001 
Mntrfee  0.0410 7.12 0.0076  0.0266 3.01 0.0829  0.0529 11.66 0.0006  0.0388 6.32 0.0120 
IndpnVC  -0.0491 15.29 <.0001  -0.0380 9.17 0.0025  -0.0613 23.52 <.0001  -0.0505 16.10 <.0001 
Internet  -0.3796 1032.70 <.0001  -0.3482 865.66 <.0001  -0.3811 1040.16 <.0001  -0.3501 874.31 <.0001 
lambda      0.6217 723.87 <.0001      0.6163 704.58 <.0001 
                                 
                 
Number of observations 81,716    81,716    81,716    81,716  
Percent censored  64.65%    64,65%    65.26%    65.26%  
                
Log likelihood -65,861    -65,497    -64,874    -64,520  
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Table 7 (continued) 
  
    Time-to-Exit through Acquisition       Time-to-Exit through IPO    
  
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
   
  
without Endogeneity control 
   
  
with Endogeneity control 
  
Independent  Estimate Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Estimate Chi-square Pr > Chi-  
Estimat
e Chi-square Pr > Chi-  Estimate Chi-square Pr > Chi- 
variables      square     square     square     square 
                 
Intercept  6.7201 35025.50 <.0001  6.8826 34096.00 <.0001  5.9521 29334.90 <.0001  6.0825 29072.40 <.0001 
Syn  -0.2854 247.22 <.0001  -1.2712 576.28 <.0001  -0.0113 0.38 0.5391  -0.9059 305.99 <.0001 
Ind  -0.3686 373.28 <.0001  -0.2334 134.94 <.0001  -0.2060 116.80 <.0001  -0.0814 16.48 <.0001 
Erly_stg  0.1203 48.36 <.0001  0.1632 88.11 <.0001  0.4816 651.23 <.0001  0.5277 771.73 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg)  -0.4399 247.37 <.0001  -0.0138 0.16 0.6929  -0.1694 32.51 <.0001  0.2273 39.08 <.0001 
Late_stg  -0.1054 30.36 <.0001  -0.0858 20.28 <.0001  -0.0408 4.32 0.0376  -0.0145 0.55 0.4575 
VC_ind  -0.0339 2.04 0.1529  -0.0489 4.26 0.0390  -0.0672 6.96 0.0083  -0.0827 10.64 0.0011 
Ivst_bk  -0.0069 0.09 0.758  0.0892 15.57 <.0001  -0.1831 62.90 <.0001  -0.0815 12.04 0.0005 
Str_stg  -0.0569 4.46 0.0346  -0.1193 19.38 <.0001  0.0238 0.66 0.4183  -0.0258 0.76 0.3828 
Co_state  -0.0940 37.24 <.0001  -0.0278 3.18 0.0746  0.0079 0.22 0.6393  0.0681 16.01 <.0001 
Hot_mkt  0.1267 70.61 <.0001  0.1102 53.64 <.0001  0.2111 177.00 <.0001  0.1896 143.30 <.0001 
Mntrfee  -0.0181 0.78 0.3771  -0.0341 2.77 0.0958  0.1389 38.69 <.0001  0.1259 32.01 <.0001 
IndpnVC  -0.1554 81.16 <.0001  -0.1443 70.30 <.0001  0.0397 5.11 0.0238  0.0501 8.20 0.0042 
Internet  -0.4459 808.01 <.0001  -0.4123 685.89 <.0001  -0.3498 414.51 <.0001  -0.3205 347.96 <.0001 
lambda      0.6477 400.14 <.0001      0.5909 344.60 <.0001 
                                 
                 
Number of observations 81,716    81,716    81,716    81,716  
Percent censored  80.39%    80.39%    84.87%    84.87%  
                
Log likelihood -46,205    -46,004    -37,269    -37,096  
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Table 7 (continued) 
  
Panel C: OLS with treatment effects 
                 
  Time-to-Exit through IPO, Acquisition, or LBO  
Time-to-Exit through IPO or 
Acquisition  Time-to-Exit through Acquisition  Time-to-Exit through IPO 
Independent  Estimate t-value Pr > t-  Estimate t-value Pr > t-  
Estimat
e t-value Pr > t-  Estimate t-value Pr > t- 
variables      value    value square    value square    value square 
                 
Intercept  4.3240 154.59 <.0001  4.3647 154.31 <.0001  4.4435 109.27 <.0001  4.2173 107.07 <.0001 
Syn  -0.4940 -11.44 <.0001  -0.4899 -11.21 <.0001  -0.4317 -6.76 <.0001  -0.4828 -8.10 <.0001 
Ind  0.0473 2.87 0.0040  0.0283 1.70 0.0895  0.0324 1.40 0.1615  0.0201 0.85 0.3967 
Erly_stg  0.2546 17.00 <.0001  0.2517 16.78 <.0001  0.2328 11.97 <.0001  0.3246 13.88 <.0001 
Ln(1+ Num_stg)  0.0974 3.49 0.0005  0.0847 3.01 0.0027  0.0308 0.81 0.4199  0.1408 3.40 0.0007 
Late_stg  -0.0281 -1.86 0.0631  -0.0102 -0.67 0.5056  -0.0058 -0.28 0.7793  -0.0410 -1.80 0.0714 
VC_ind  -0.0460 -2.34 0.0194  -0.0438 -2.22 0.0266  -0.1049 -4.01 <.0001  0.0244 0.82 0.4109 
Ivst_bk  0.0617 3.50 0.0005  0.0627 3.53 0.0004  0.0819 3.48 0.0005  0.0170 0.64 0.5231 
Str_stg  -0.0595 -2.57 0.0103  -0.0514 -2.19 0.0288  -0.0968 -3.16 0.0016  0.0302 0.84 0.4015 
Co_state  0.0739 5.72 <.0001  0.0733 5.66 <.0001  0.0816 4.89 <.0001  0.0649 3.22 0.0013 
Hot_mkt  0.1894 15.24 <.0001  0.1798 14.37 <.0001  0.1585 9.60 <.0001  0.2071 11.01 <.0001 
Mntrfee  0.0350 2.04 0.0410  0.0409 2.36 0.0183  0.0126 0.56 0.5737  0.0961 3.59 0.0003 
IndpnVC  -0.0289 -2.05 0.0402  -0.0362 -2.55 0.0108  -0.1002 -5.21 <.0001  0.0434 2.09 0.0367 
Internet  -0.6401 -47.96 <.0001  -0.6444 -48.11 <.0001  -0.8375 -47.77 <.0001  -0.3781 -18.52 <.0001 
lambda  0.3149 11.92 <.0001  0.3139 11.76 <.0001  0.2940 7.56 <.0001  0.3111 8.54 <.0001 
                                 
                 
Number of observations 28,887    28,388    16,026    12,362  
F-value  234.04    234.15    208.18    62.02  
Pr > F <.0001    <.0001    <.0001    <.0001  
Adjusted R-square  0.1015    0.1031    0.1533    0.0646  
                 
Notes. In this table we present a model to explain exit times The table contains two regressions. First, we provide the results without the endogeneity correction, 
and second, with the endogeneity correction. The variable "Syn" is the dummy variable for whether the venture is syndicated or not. “Syn” in the analysis with 
endogeneity control is the predicted probability of syndication estimated by a first stage probit. Results are provided broken down by IPO and by ACQ 
(acquisition) routes. See the definitions of explanatory variables in Appendix A. 
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Table 8  
The Effect of Syndication on Exit Multiples  
 
    Dependent variable = ann_mltp     Dependent variable = abn_ann_mltp  
    
without 
Endogeneity 
control      
with 
Endogeneity 
control      
without 
Endogeneity 
control      
with 
Endogeneity 
control   
Independent  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t 
variables   estimates      estimates      estimates      estimates     
                 
Intercept  0.6255 1.53 0.1259  0.6979 1.34 0.1790  -0.5105 -1.32 0.1860  -0.3498 -0.71 0.4757 
Syn  0.7164 3.26 0.0012  0.5503 0.72 0.4731  0.4952 2.38 0.0173  0.1264 0.17 0.8615 
Ind  0.5107 1.95 0.0518  0.5299 1.92 0.0549  0.0199 0.08 0.9361  0.0625 0.24 0.8105 
Erly_stg  0.2407 1.43 0.1521  0.2422 1.44 0.1501  0.2177 1.37 0.1704  0.2209 1.39 0.1645 
Ln(1+ Num_stg) -0.6981 -2.63 0.0086  -0.6492 -1.90 0.0581  -0.5335 -2.13 0.0336  -0.4250 -1.31 0.1889 
Late_stg  0.0836 0.50 0.6156  0.0812 0.49 0.6266  0.0013 0.01 0.9932  -0.0040 -0.03 0.9800 
VC_ind  -0.4815 -2.35 0.0189  -0.4824 -2.35 0.0188  -0.6435 -3.32 0.0009  -0.6454 -3.33 0.0009 
Ivst_bk  -0.0964 -0.54 0.5859  -0.0858 -0.47 0.6397  -0.0384 -0.23 0.8183  -0.0148 -0.09 0.9321 
Str_stg  0.4774 1.62 0.1045  0.4723 1.60 0.1095  0.3143 1.13 0.2578  0.3028 1.09 0.2772 
Co_state  0.2263 1.76 0.0779  0.2318 1.77 0.0761  0.0701 0.58 0.5633  0.0822 0.67 0.5051 
Hot_mkt  0.8240 5.17 <.0001  0.8224 5.15 <.0001  0.6046 4.02 <.0001  0.6008 3.98 <.0001 
Mntrfee  0.3898 1.80 0.0716  0.3860 1.78 0.0753  0.3615 1.77 0.0769  0.3532 1.72 0.0849 
IndpnVC  0.1544 0.91 0.3630  0.1555 0.92 0.3600  0.0961 0.60 0.5489  0.0986 0.61 0.5391 
Internet  0.3013 2.36 0.0184  0.3030 2.37 0.0180  -0.0576 -0.48 0.6329  -0.0538 -0.45 0.6561 
lambda      0.0971 0.23 0.8211      0.2155 0.53 0.5951 
                 
Number of observations 1,407    1,407    1,407    1,407  
F-value   6.83    6.35    3.95    3.68  
Pr > F   <.0001    <.0001    <.0001    <.0001  
Adjusted R-square  0.0512    0.0505    0.0265    0.0260  
 
Notes. In this table we present a model to explain the annualized multiple from exit, to assess if syndication adds value. The table contains two regressions. First, 
we provide the results without the endogeneity correction, and second, with the endogeneity correction. The variable "Syn" is the dummy variable for whether 
the venture is syndicated or not. “Syn” in the analysis with endogeneity control is the predicted probability of syndication estimated via a first stage probit. The 
dependent variables are the annualized exit multiple (ann_mltp) and industry-mean-adjusted abnormal multiples (abn_ann_mltp). See the definitions of 
explanatory variables in Appendix B. 
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Table 9  
The Effect of Syndication on Exit Multiples by Exit Route  
 
    Dependent variable = ann_mltp for Acquisition     Dependent variable = abn_ ann_mltp for Acquisition  
    
without 
Endogeneity 
control      
with 
Endogeneity 
control      
without 
Endogeneity 
control      
with 
Endogeneity 
control   
Independent  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t 
variables   estimates      estimates      estimates      estimates     
                 
Intercept  0.1361 0.19 0.8510  0.3334 0.38 0.7027  -1.1217 -1.64 0.1017  -0.7490 -0.91 0.3639 
Syn  0.9858 2.37 0.0181  0.4525 0.33 0.7431  0.7728 1.97 0.0496  -0.2347 -0.18 0.8571 
Ind  0.3861 0.75 0.4516  0.4753 0.85 0.3948  -0.2665 -0.55 0.5821  -0.0980 -0.19 0.8525 
Erly_stg  0.6881 2.42 0.0158  0.6925 2.43 0.0153  0.5833 2.17 0.0302  0.5916 2.20 0.0281 
Ln(1+ Num_stg) -0.4811 -1.06 0.2896  -0.3223 -0.54 0.5913  -0.2875 -0.67 0.5026  0.0125 0.02 0.9824 
Late_stg  -0.1594 -0.52 0.6015  -0.1659 -0.54 0.5874  -0.1649 -0.57 0.5671  -0.1773 -0.61 0.5391 
VC_ind  -0.4496 -1.31 0.1896  -0.4493 -1.31 0.1902  -0.6609 -2.04 0.0414  -0.6603 -2.04 0.0416 
Ivst_bk  -0.1307 -0.41 0.6810  -0.0893 -0.27 0.7893  -0.1542 -0.51 0.6075  -0.0760 -0.24 0.8097 
Str_stg  0.3753 0.82 0.4123  0.3543 0.77 0.4422  0.1414 0.33 0.7435  0.1017 0.23 0.8152 
Co_state  0.2234 1.01 0.3119  0.2403 1.07 0.2856  0.1811 0.87 0.3854  0.2129 1.00 0.3161 
Hot_mkt  1.1365 4.34 <.0001  1.1301 4.30 <.0001  0.9316 3.76 0.0002  0.9196 3.71 0.0002 
Mntrfee  0.1923 0.59 0.5525  0.1761 0.54 0.5898  0.2163 0.71 0.4795  0.1854 0.60 0.5475 
IndpnVC  0.2533 0.78 0.4329  0.2581 0.80 0.4249  0.3076 1.01 0.3133  0.3166 1.04 0.2997 
Internet  -0.2106 -0.96 0.3396  -0.2037 -0.92 0.3574  -0.3713 -1.78 0.0749  -0.3583 -1.72 0.0866 
lambda      0.3400 0.41 0.6854      0.6423 0.81 0.4176 
                 
Number of observations 610    610    610    610  
F-value   3.93    3.66    3.19    3.01  
Pr > F   <.0001    <.0001    0.0001    0.0002  
Adjusted R-square  0.0589    0.0576    0.0447    0.0441  
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Table 9 (continued) 
  
    Dependent variable = ann_mltp for IPO     Dependent variable = abn_ann_mltp for IPO  
    
without 
Endogeneity 
control      
with 
Endogeneity 
control      
without 
Endogeneity 
control      
with 
Endogeneity 
control   
Independent  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t  Coefficient t-value Pr > t 
variables   estimates      estimates      estimates      estimates     
                 
Intercept  1.2525 2.65 0.0083  1.3645 2.18 0.0294  0.1293 0.29 0.7737  0.2446 0.41 0.6807 
Syn  0.4488 1.83 0.0671  0.2096 0.23 0.8171  0.2522 1.08 0.2786  0.0060 0.01 0.9944 
Ind  0.4836 1.70 0.0902  0.5054 1.71 0.0883  0.1224 0.45 0.6515  0.1449 0.51 0.6068 
Erly_stg  -0.1565 -0.78 0.4346  -0.1560 -0.78 0.4363  -0.0937 -0.49 0.6225  -0.0932 -0.49 0.6245 
Ln(1+ Num_stg) -0.7843 -2.48 0.0133  -0.7151 -1.77 0.0775  -0.6497 -2.16 0.0309  -0.5785 -1.50 0.1329 
Late_stg  0.1235 0.66 0.5093  0.1198 0.64 0.5235  0.0229 0.13 0.8977  0.0190 0.11 0.9151 
VC_ind  -0.4254 -1.72 0.0850  -0.4279 -1.73 0.0836  -0.5728 -2.44 0.0148  -0.5754 -2.45 0.0144 
Ivst_bk  -0.0384 -0.19 0.8505  -0.0254 -0.12 0.9032  0.0734 0.38 0.7046  0.0867 0.44 0.6627 
Str_stg  0.4546 1.20 0.2308  0.4497 1.18 0.2367  0.3926 1.09 0.2761  0.3876 1.07 0.2832 
Co_state  0.1478 0.97 0.3314  0.1554 1.00 0.3153  -0.0871 -0.60 0.5469  -0.0793 -0.54 0.5897 
Hot_mkt  0.4152 2.12 0.0340  0.4132 2.11 0.0351  0.2227 1.20 0.2311  0.2206 1.19 0.2361 
Mntrfee  0.7657 2.55 0.0108  0.7664 2.55 0.0108  0.6618 2.32 0.0204  0.6625 2.32 0.0204 
IndpnVC  0.0803 0.43 0.6670  0.0825 0.44 0.6589  -0.0488 -0.28 0.7833  -0.0465 -0.26 0.7935 
Internet  0.7737 5.08 <.0001  0.7755 5.09 <.0001  0.2765 1.91 0.0562  0.2784 1.92 0.0550 
lambda      0.1330 0.27 0.7840      0.1369 0.30 0.7665 
                 
Number of observations 797    797    797    797  
F-value   5.32    4.94    2.10    1.95  
Pr > F   <.0001    <.0001    0.0124    0.0188  
Adjusted R-square  0.0659    0.0648    0.0176    0.0165  
 
Notes. In this table we present a model to explain the annualized multiple from exit, to assess if syndication adds value. The table contains two regressions. First, 
we provide the results without the endogeneity correction, and second, with the endogeneity correction. The variable "Syn" is the dummy variable for whether 
the venture is syndicated or not. “Syn” in the analysis with endogeneity control is the predicted probability of syndication estimated by a first stage probit. The 
dependent variables are the annualized exit multiple (ann_mltp) and industry-mean-adjusted abnormal multiples (abn_ann_mltp). See the definitions of 
explanatory variables in Appendix A. Results are provided broken down by IPO and by ACQ (acquisition) routes.
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Table 10 
Out-of-sample forecasts of exit multiples for syndicated and non-syndicated firms. 
 
Panel A: Expected Annualized Multiples calculated with parameter estimates obtained from regressions without treatment effect control 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl t Value Pr > |t| t-test t-value syn=0 vs. 1 t-test p-value syn=0 vs. 1 
Non-syndicated 23,782 1.3472 1.3608 0.6370 0.9206 1.8571 326.16 <.0001 -129.14 <.0001 
Syndicated 58,120 1.9781 1.9902 0.6338 1.5232 2.4348 752.46 <.0001   
 
 
Panel B: Expected Annualized Multiples calculated with parameter estimates obtained from treatment effect controlled regressions 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl t Value Pr > |t| t-test t-value syn=0 vs. 1 t-test p-value syn=0 vs. 1 
Non-syndicated 23,782 1.3822 1.4048 0.6386 0.9517 1.8776 333.76 <.0001 -123.01 <.0001 
Syndicated 58,120 1.9859 2.0009 0.6350 1.5322 2.4476 753.94 <.0001   
 
Notes. We applied our estimated model for exit multiples to firms for which we did not have exit multiples, but for whom we had knowledge of whether they 
were syndicated or not. Since we have already established that firms with syndication generate higher annualized (return) multiples, we expect that the expected 
multiples from our model should be higher for syndicated firms that we did not use in the original model. We verified these results for models with and without 
endogeneity corrections.  
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Table 11 
First round only results 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Syndication 
 
Independent  Coefficient       Chi- Pr > Chi- 
variables   estimates  square square 
     
Intercept  -2.3042 2427.13 <.0001 
Ind   0.3980 597.72 <.0001 
VC_intN  -0.2319 118.23 <.0001 
VC_indf  -0.0140 0.68 0.4104 
Ln(1+ Rd_ivst) 0.2436 2953.96 <.0001 
Ln(1+VC_numC) 0.0772 402.48 <.0001 
VC_ind  0.0643 6.50 0.0108 
Str_stg  -0.0772 11.83 0.0006 
CVC  0.1538 19.03 <.0001 
Co_state  0.1347 43.95 <.0001 
VCstate  0.1696 53.30 <.0001 
Asymden_MSA 0.0093 0.51 0.4732 
Entropy_MSA -0.0518 50.01 <.0001 
CVC_ivst_MSA 0.8603 66.02 <.0001 
Hot_mkt  -0.0973 38.92 <.0001 
Log Likelihood  -20,723  
Wald Chi-square  5,301  
Pr > Wald Chi-square  <.0001  
Cox and Snell R-square  0.1616  
Nagelkerke Max-rescaled R-  0.2155  
Number of observations  34,267  
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Table 11 (continued) 
  
Panel B: Coefficient on "Syn" in performance analyses 
 
Exit probability     
 Exit_1 without endogeneity control + 
  biprobit   + 
 Exit_2 without endogeneity control + 
  biprobit   + 
 ACQ without endogeneity control + 
  biprobit   + 
 IPO without endogeneity control insignificant 
  biprobit   + 
     
Time-to-exit     
Hazard model analysis  
 Exit_1 without endogeneity control >1 
  w/ endogeneity control >1 
 Exit_2 without endogeneity control >1 
  w/ endogeneity control >1 
 ACQ without endogeneity control >1 
  w/ endogeneity control >1 
 IPO without endogeneity control >1 
  w/ endogeneity control >1 
Tobit analysis     
 Exit_1 without endogeneity control - 
  w/ endogeneity control - 
 Exit_2 without endogeneity control - 
  w/ endogeneity control - 
 ACQ without endogeneity control - 
  w/ endogeneity control - 
 IPO without endogeneity control - 
  w/ endogeneity control - 
OLS analysis     
 Exit_1 w/ endogeneity control - 
 Exit_2 w/ endogeneity control - 
 ACQ w/ endogeneity control - 
 IPO w/ endogeneity control - 
     
Exit Multiples     
ann_mltp as a dependent variable  
 all without endogeneity control + 
  w/ endogeneity control insignificant 
 ACQ without endogeneity control + 
  w/ endogeneity control insignificant 
 IPO without endogeneity control + 
  w/ endogeneity control insignificant 
abn_ann_mltp as a dependent variable  
 all without endogeneity control + 
  w/ endogeneity control insignificant 
 ACQ without endogeneity control insignificant 
  w/ endogeneity control insignificant 
 IPO without endogeneity control insignificant 
  w/ endogeneity control insignificant 
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Table 11 (continued) 
  
Notes. In order to assess the robustness of our results, we rerun all the empirical analyses with first round 
venture investment only. We report results for the first pass of the regression in which the determinants of 
syndication are established in Panel A, and results for the second pass, wherein performance metrics for (a) exit 
multiples, (b) time to exit, and (c) probability of exit are assessed, in Panel B. For compactness of exposition in 
Panel B, we report the signs of the coefficients on Syn, so that ease of comparison across models is also 
enhanced. Panel A relates to the empirical results in Table 5. Panel B relates to the results in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 
9. In the first round only analyses, Erly_stg, Late_stg, and Num_stg are not included. Ivst_bk is also not 
included because no investment bank is a lead underwriter for the first round investment. 
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Fig. 1. CDFs of multiples 
This figure presents the cumulative distribution function of annualized multiples for syndicated and non-syndicated firms. The plot shows that after a multiple 
level of 2, the syndicated firms demonstrate a much fatter tail, i.e. the likelihood of a large multiple is higher for syndicated firms than for non-syndicated ones. 
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Fig. 2. Probability of syndication given a level of multiple 
This figure shows the results of a Bayesian analysis of the distribution functions in Figure 1 to compute the posterior probability of the venture being syndicated 
for each level of annualized multiple. Instead of assuming the prior probabilities of syndication to be the actual proportions in the data, we assumed them to be 
diffuse, i.e. half each. For each level of multiple (Y) we calculated the posterior Prob(Synd|Y) = Prob(Y|Synd)/[Prob(Y|Synd)xProb(Synd)+Prob(Y|NoSynd)x 
Prob(NoSynd)]. We then smoothed this probability function and plotted it as above. We can see that the posterior probability of the venture being syndicated 
rises as the multiple increases. When the annualized multiple is greater than 2, the Prob(Synd|Y)>0.5.   
Posterior probability of Syndication given Multiple level
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